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SUMMARY 
Outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) from Hungary has been increas-
ing since 1997. Until that year, the value 
of Hungarian investment abroad had 
been insignificant. Since then, Hungary 
has become one of the main investors in 
the CEE region. The quantity and geo-
graphical and sectoral distribution of 
outward investment are heavily influ-
enced by large single projects, which can 
dominate the annual figures. Apart from 
the official data, the analysis in this paper 
was based on a questionnaire survey. 
The 22 companies that responded repre-
sented hardly 2 per cent of the Hungar-
ian companies that have invested abroad, 
but their investments there amounted to 
52 per cent of the total capital placement 
from Hungary. Thus it covered the large, 
important investors, who were mainly 
‘old’, traditional, domestically controlled 
companies that were relatively well capi-
talized. 
Neighbouring countries were 
clearly favoured by Hungarian investors. 
Apart from those established in offshore 
areas, most affiliates of Hungarian com-
panies in the EU or other regions were 
set up for sales and trading products, 
while most Hungarian affiliates in the 
CEE region were production companies. 
Concerning the market entry modes and 
forms, acquisition of foreign firms is 
somewhat more popular than greenfield 
investment. Hungarian companies prefer 
100 per cent ownership. The dominant 
legal form of the affiliates is a limited 
company. The main motive for establish-
ing affiliates abroad proved to be the ac-
quisition and expansion of market share 
and strategic considerations. According 
to respondents, such expectations were 
realized, and market share, exports and 
production increased. Effects on em-
ployment at the parent company were 
rather neutral. 
The most important factors hinder-
ing OFDI were said to be host-country 
risks, followed by financing of invest-
ment. Some investors said they would 
welcome measures by the Hungarian 
government, banks and other organiza-
tions in the fields of providing informa-
tion and guarantees. 
It has been seen that OFDI by Hun-
garian companies in recent years has be-
come more intensive. Several firms have 
expanded or plan to do so in the near 
future. The survey included a question 
on the plans of companies for their for-
eign affiliates. Eight respondents said 
they planned to expand existing affiliates 
and 10 planned to establish new ones 
within two years, which means that 82 
per cent of the respondents planned to 
expand soon. In the longer run (the next 
five years), the figures were 9 and 8 
respectively (77 per cent).  
The investment strategy and plans 
of firms are influenced by several factors. 
The prospects for Hungarian OFDI de-
pend on factors that can be grouped as 
home-country and host-country factors. 
The most important domestic, home-
country factors were the firm’s financial 
situation and development. Several of the 
Hungarian companies had begun to 
prosper, making considerable profits. 
These profits could be invested in Hun-
gary (assisted by the growth of the do-
mestic market) or abroad. The latter was 
attractive especially if competition was 
strong and home markets saturated. (The 
survey results showed that domestic 
competition was an important push fac-
tor for OFDI.) 
  
 
The profit-creating capacity of the 
firms depended, of course, on the trend 
in the domestic economy. Hungary was 
showing good results, with average an-
nual GDP increases of 4.8 per cent be-
tween 1997 and 2000. The Hungarian 
productivity increases were also out-
standing in the region, while inflation 
and unemployment were falling. How-
ever, the prospects in the immediate fu-
ture seem to be bleaker, with worldwide 
recession being forecast. This is already 
being felt by the multinationals function-
ing in Hungary, and because of their 
strong role in the economy, by their 
many domestic suppliers and partners. 
The Hungarian economy and industrial 
output are showing signs of slowing 
down. Another problem is the sluggish 
stock exchange, which has caused prob-
lems with raising capital for the bigger 
firms that account for the bulk of Hun-
garian OFDI. 
Turning to host-country factors, the 
most important is the prospect of increas-
ing market share. The survey found that 
market opportunities in the region were 
extremely important for Hungarian in-
vestors. Future market expansion and 
economic growth in the neighbouring 
countries can provide good opportuni-
ties. The ongoing privatization process in 
these countries offers chances of partici-
pation. Whether these are taken will de-
pend on the balance between the advan-
tages favouring Hungarian firms (prox-
imity, language, knowledge and con-
tacts) and the drawback of relatively low 
capitalization compared with Western 
multinationals. 
The trends in labour costs and pro-
ductivity, and possible improvements in 
human capital, may also play a role in 
the investment decisions of Hungarian 
firms, although they have not been sig-
nificant so far. However, the local infra-
structure is important. As transport and 
communications improve, so will the 
conditions for investment. Another major 
factor is the economic policy of host coun-
tries. The macroeconomic situation is less 
stable in Eastern European countries than 
it is in Hungary and inflation is higher. 
Also significant are direct incentives. The 
number of special areas, industrial parks 
and customs-free zones is increasing in 
neighbouring countries. Certainly, legal 
and political stability and decreasing bu-
reaucracy are important host-country 
factors alongside the economic condi-
tions. 
All in all, the complexity of the fac-
tors influencing Hungarian OFDI makes 
it very difficult to predict the medium 
and long-term development of it. In the 
short term, the rising trend can certainly 
be expected to continue, although the 
realization or cancellation of certain large 
investment projects may be decisive to 
the outflow figures in particular years. 
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INTRODUCTION* 
One important phenomenon of the last 
century has been a rapid increase in the 
direct investment flows between coun-
tries. The spread of globalization and the 
activity of multinational corporations 
have been driving forces behind these 
flows, which have already been analysed 
from numerous points of view. For less 
developed countries intent on catching 
up with the developed economies, the 
main emphasis is naturally on invest-
ment inflows from the latter. This has 
also been the case in the transformation 
countries, where inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) became in the 1990s a 
significant source of economic develop-
ment. Much less attention has been paid 
to outward investment (OFDI) by these 
countries, mainly because it was negligi-
ble until recently. However, firms in 
these countries have shown increasing 
investment activity abroad in the last 
three or four years. This applies also to 
Hungary. 
The paper begins with an overview 
of the legislation and macroeconomic 
situation in Hungary (covering geo-
graphical and sectoral distribution and 
investment in the service sector). It goes 
on to describe the net investment posi-
tion of Hungary, attempting to place the 
country’s investment development path 
and trace the links between inward and 
outward FDI. The second part analyses 
the features of outward investment from 
the firms’ point of view, relying partly on 
the findings of a survey carried out in the 
first half of 2001. The topics discussed are 
the motives behind investment, modes of 
market entry, the effects of investment, 
                                                 
*
 Study prepared for PHARE ACE Project No. 
P98–1162–R: ‘EU Integration-Driven Investment 
Networking – Outward Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in Candidate Countries’. 
and the barriers and problems that in-
vesting firms face. 
1. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Outward FDI from Hungary existed even 
in the communist period. The main 
means of internationalization by firms 
was exporting, of course, for which the 
economic system of COMECON created an 
artificial, regulated geographical struc-
ture. According to Oszlay (2000), the 
main role of OFDI during the period 
1950–90 was to offset the effects of this 
distorted trade structure to some extent. 
Certainly, the volume of OFDI remained 
very low and was mainly carried out by 
foreign-trade organizations in specific 
industries.1 
The main targets of the investment 
activity were Germany and Austria. The 
OFDI was concentrated on segments in 
which Hungary was a strong exporter: 
medical equipment (Medicor), pharma-
ceuticals (Medimpex) and electrical light-
ing products (Tungsram). At the end of 
1983, Hungary had 107 investments in 
the West, including 28 in West Germany, 
23 in Austria, 10 in the UK, 10 in the 
United States and 7 in France. There were 
also 44 investments in the developing 
South at that time, including 14 in the 
Middle East, 13 in Africa, 11 in Latin 
America and 6 in Asia (MCMILLAN, 
1987). 
Hungarian investment in the West 
was mainly undertaken to support ex-
ports in target countries. The main fields 
of activity were services (transport, fi-
nancial and consumer services) and to a 
small extent manufacturing. In the de-
veloping countries, however, export 
                                                 
1 This applies even though Hungary, unlike other 
COMECON countries, allowed firms to effect OFDI 
without the mediation of foreign trade organiza-
tions. 
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promotion and trade were secondary to 
the establishment of production facilities 
and the related infrastructure, and access 
to raw materials. 
Some of these foreign subsidiaries 
survived the change of system in 1989, 
but the majority of them were wound up 
when their parent companies were re-
structured. At the same time, some agen-
cies of former foreign trade organizations 
became independent ventures (OSZLAY, 
2000). 
2. LEGISLATION AND AN 
OVERVIEW AT THE END OF THE 
1990S 
The legal framework for OFDI in Hungary 
today is comparable to the one in any 
developed market economy. Before 1995, 
outward investment was tied to a case-
by-case permit procedure. Permits were 
issued by the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade. With the 
passage of Act XCV/1995 on foreign ex-
change, residents in Hungary were able, 
from January 1996 onwards, to establish 
or acquire companies or stakes without a 
permit, although registration at the Na-
tional Bank of Hungary (NBH) remains 
necessary, under the following condi-
tions:2 
* The stake to be acquired made up 
more than 10 per cent of the target 
company’s capital. 
* The laws of the host country permitted 
the repatriation of dividends and prof-
its. 
* The investor fulfilled domestic tax, 
customs, social insurance and similar 
regulations and had no debts or liabili-
ties towards the authorities. 
                                                 
2 For more detail, see Oszlay (2000). 
* The investor had not been subject to 
insolvency or liquidation proceedings 
in the previous two years. 
If these conditions were not met, a 
preliminary permit was required. 
On June 15, 2001, the Hungarian 
government lifted all foreign-exchange 
restrictions and introduced full converti-
bility of the forint. This means that Hun-
garian residents may open forint and for-
eign-currency accounts abroad without 
applying for permission from the au-
thorities, and direct acquisitions of busi-
ness associations abroad are exempt from 
normative criteria and prior notice. This 
means that firms investing abroad will 
not be registered at all. 
The available data on outward in-
vestment is far from adequate. Between 
1991 and 1995, the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade issued detailed reports analys-
ing OFDI. Control over OFDI passed in 
1996 to the NBH, but information was 
made available about the number of in-
vestments and the target countries only 
in 1996–7 and again from 1999. Since 
1999, the NBH, as a kind of check on the 
balance-of-payment figures, collects sur-
vey information on flow and stock data 
from firms that have invested more than 
HUF 10 million abroad. Last year, the 
NBH requested information from 191 of 
the 1187 legal entities registered as in-
vesting abroad.3 These reports are not 
published, but they are the source of the 
geographical and sectoral distribution 
tables of OFDI flows published and sent 
to Eurostat and the OECD. (Unfortu-
nately, the surveys are not processed or 
analysed according to the form or struc-
ture of the ownership of the investment.) 
The NBH does not publish sectoral data 
or data on the geographical distribution 
of the OFDI holdings. 
                                                 
3 These 191 firms include 46 productive (manu-
facturing) companies and others in construction, 
trade, services or investment. Budapest is the 
headquarters of 101 of the firms. 
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Nor is there any information avail-
able on non-cash investments in kind. 
Thus, the data availability and statistical 
system in Hungary is not perfect and it is 
not really possible to compile a consistent 
time series. The structure and the devel-
opment of the OFDI cannot be analysed 
thoroughly, so that this paper can only 
hint at certain tendencies. Apart from the 
‘central data-source’ questionnaires, 
there have also been some informative 
case studies and interviews about some 
companies. 
 
Let us turn to the macroeconomic fea-
tures of OFDI from Hungary. The end of 
the state-socialist economic system and 
the cataclysmic loss the old COMECON 
markets put Hungarian firms through a 
certain 
learning 
process 
about the 
market 
economy, 
liberaliza-
tion and 
increased 
competi-
tion, and 
the entry 
of foreign 
capital. By the mid-1990s, the situation 
for the survivors had stabilized and the 
big quoted companies especially had 
gained the strength and capital to ven-
ture into OFDI. 
The data in Table 2 derive from the 
balance-of-payments statistics, which 
register OFDI since 1993 and inter-
company loans since 1996. Between 1993 
and 1996, OFDI from Hungary was spo-
radic and almost negligible, but it has 
gained momentum since 1997. Hungary, 
with Є389 million of OFDI in 1997, be-
came and remains the most important 
investor in 
the Central 
and Eastern 
European 
(CEE) region. 
The year 2001 
showed an 
exceptionally 
high share of 
inter-
company 
loans. In 1998 
and 2000, 
Hungarian 
OFDI reached 
remarkable 
heights (Є621 
million in 2000). As a consequence, the 
overall stock of OFDI was around Є2.3 
billion at the end of 2001 (equivalent to 
almost one-tenth of the inward FDI 
stock). In 2001, the outflow of FDI was 
Є377 million. 
Table 1 
Country profile: Hungary 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Real GDP growth (%) -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.5 5.2 
GDP per capita (USD) 3745 4046 4367 4433 4504 4710 4808 4570 
Inflation (CPI) 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8 
Unemployment rate (%) 15.2 12.0 11.7 9.9 8.7 7.8 7.0 6.4 
Exports/GDP 23 26 29 30 40 49 52 61 
Imports/GDP 33 35 34 35 45 55 58 70 
Agriculture/GDP 6.5 6.7 7.2 6.5 6.3 5.8 4.9 4.3 
Industry/ GDP 26.2 25.3 26.9 26.4 28.2 29.4 28.0 31.5 
Services /GDP 61.8 62.8 60.9 62.9 61.1 60.1 62.5 59.6 
HUF/USD 92.03 105.1 125.7 152.5 186.7 214.4 237.3 282.2 
HUF/EUR 107.5 124.8 162.6 191.1 210.9 240.9 252.8 260.1 
Sources: Central Statistical Office (CSO) and NBH data. 
Table 2 
OFDI from Hungary 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  
Balance-of-payments statistics, Є million 
Balance of equity and other shares 9.4 41.2 33.3 43.1* 258 412 235 621 358 
Balance of inter-company loans N/A N/A N/A 0 131 16 2 -18 19 
Total 9.4 41.2 33.3 43.1* 389 428 237 603 377 
End-year stock of equity** - - - - - 1169 1376 1915 2331 
 Interconnected loans - - - - - 117 192 248 378 
* Excluding a Є45.5 million divestment by the National Bank of Hungary. 
** Stock is calculated from cumulative flows at the NBH. 
Source: NBH. 
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With the geographical distribution of 
annual flows (stock figures are not avail-
able), it should be borne in mind that 
data between 1996 and 1998 were based 
on investment intentions registered with 
the NBH. The intentions in a certain year, 
however, were often realized only in the 
succeeding year (or never realized at all), 
so that the sum of these data differs 
sometimes considerably from the bal-
ance-of-payments data. In 1996, the total 
value of intentions was somewhat higher 
than the balance-of-payments data, but in 
1997, it was vice-versa: the balance-of-
payments data were higher than the 
value of the registered intentions. (This 
means that intentions in the previous 
year were being realized in 1997.) The 
situation has been better since 1999, be-
cause the geographical structure of the 
balance-of-payments data (not the inten-
tions any more) has been made available 
by the NBH. 
High year-to-year fluctuations can 
be observed in the destinations of the 
OFDI (Table 3). In 1996, 26.7 per cent of 
the registered investment intentions were 
directed to CEE countries and 66 per cent 
to the EU (ANTALÓCZY et al., 2000). How-
ever, 80 per cent of the latter was invest-
ment in the Channel Islands, with obvi-
ous tax motives. Excluding that, the real 
investments were realized mainly in the 
CEE region, above all Slovakia and Ro-
mania. 
The main destination of investment 
intention in 1997 was the EU again. Once 
more, tax avoidance presumably played 
the main role, but instead of the Channel 
Islands, the recipient was the Nether-
lands, which received 78 per cent of the 
OFDI from Hungary to the EU. (The 
Netherlands Antilles forms a popular 
transit destination for investors, because 
of its very favourable tax regime. In most 
cases, an affiliate estab-
lished in the Nether-
lands transfers the in-
vestment by the parent 
company to another, 
final destination. The 
same applies with in-
ward FDI, where the 
Dutch share of flows 
into Hungary is again 
very high, as it is of 
flows into Spain and 
Portugal.4) 
Apart from such 
tax-related flows, there 
was substantial OFDI 
from Hungary to Aus-
tria,5 but the main des-
                                                 
4 In 1996, for example, 23 per cent of the FDI flow 
into Spain came statistically from the Nether-
lands, but only 4.6 per cent really originated in 
the Netherlands (data from the Spanish Ministry 
of Industry). 
5 Regarding the amounts invested in Austria, the 
bulk came from a few big Hungarian companies 
with the necessary capital to establish and main-
tain trading affiliates abroad. Examples include 
MOL Austria Handels GmbH and BorsodChem Han-
delsgesellschaft mbH. Another big firm, Neuer Hun-
garostahl, is jointly owned. The Hungarian firm 
Hungexpo had a joint affiliate in Vienna, Expo-
concept, with Wiener Messen, but this closed after 
disagreements among the owners. Representative 
offices of previously big Hungarian foreign trade 
organizations were converted into companies in 
some cases, such as Hungarian Industries-
Beteiligungen GmbH, in which Hungarian textile 
companies have shares (see Box 4). Apart from 
the big players, several small-scale businesses 
Table 3 
Main destinations of OFDI from Hungary 
(%) 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Austria 8.7 2.3 15.0 5.5 11.6 12.3 7.3 5.3 
Czech Repub-
lic 
    and Slovakia 
15.5 0.7 16.4 8.9 3.6 0.6 4.9 55.8 
Romania 3.8 13.5 20.5 8.5 7.6 5.7 24.0 1.5 
Germany 8.2 3.1 10.0 2.2 3.7 1.7 2.9 7.2 
Cyprus N/A N/A N/A 0.6 0.7 9.8 7.7 6.1 
Denmark – – – – – – – 21.7 
Netherlands N/A N/A N/A 0.7 61.8 23.2 18.2 1.5 
United States N/A N/A N/A 4.9 2.9 0.3 16.7 1.0 
Poland N/A N/A N/A 0.6 1.2 1.5 4.5 0.6 
Source: NBH (registered intentions 1996–8). 
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tination remained the CEE region, with 
Slovakia and Romania to the fore. 
In 1998, the Netherlands absorbed 
23 per cent of Hungary’s OFDI, Switzer-
land 36.9 per cent and Cyprus almost 10 
per cent. Presumably, the main motive 
remained tax avoidance. Austria re-
mained the most significant EU destina-
tion with 12.3 per cent. The CEE region 
took 18 per cent. 
The situation began to change in 
1999. The neighbouring CEE region be-
came the main destination of Hungarian 
OFDI, with Romania the commonest tar-
get. The EU absorbed 29.8 per cent of the 
investment (61 per cent of this went to 
the Netherlands and 25 per cent to Aus-
tria). Interestingly, ‘third’ countries such 
as the United States, Canada and South 
Korea received 22 per cent of Hungary’s 
OFDI. 
The dominance of the neighbouring 
countries continued in 2000, with more 
than 57 per cent of the OFDI being di-
rected to the CEE region. This is due to 
the acquisition by the MOL fuels com-
pany of a large stake in the Slovak corpo-
ration Slovnaft. Romania had a much 
smaller share than in the previous year, 
while 1.7 per cent of the investment went 
to Russia. Regarding the EU, 36.5 per 
cent of the OFDI was directed there, with 
Germany and Austria remaining impor-
tant destinations. However, Denmark 
                                                                           
have set up joint ventures with Austrian partners, 
unsuccessfully in some cases. According to esti-
mates, about 200 wholly or partly Hungarian 
firms are present in Austria (information from 
Károly Bedő, ITDH Trade Office, Vienna). Austria 
can play an intermediary role in investment as 
well as in trade. The Hungarian firm Gardenia 
(textiles, curtains, see Box 4) founded a holding 
company there at the beginning of the 1990s, 
through which it channelled investment to the 
Slovak Republic and Croatia. Intermediary pro-
cedures of this kind may help to circumvent na-
tional prejudices in the receiving country and 
obtain better credit conditions there (Antalóczy et 
al., 2000). 
also appeared, with the largest, 21.7 per 
cent share of the Hungarian OFDI. This 
could be attributed to an investment by 
Sara Lee Hungary (see Note 24). Invest-
ment in the Netherlands and the United 
States declined. The year also differs 
from the others concerning divestments. 
These had been negligible until 1999, but 
in 2000, a total of Є54 million was di-
vested.  
 
Table 4 
Geographical distribution of OFDI flows 
from Hungarian residents in 2000 
 
Divestment Investment Balance Country 
Equity (Є million) 
USA 0.8 7.5 –6.7 
Australia 0.1 0.2 –0.0 
Austria 2.0 35.2 –33.3 
Belgium 0.4 1.3 –0.9 
Bulgaria – 0.1 –0.1 
Cyprus – 38.0 –38.0 
Czech Republic – 46.7 –46.7 
Denmark – 136.0 –136.0 
South Korea 11.7 0.0 11.7 
France 0.1 0.6 –0.5 
Netherlands 0.2 10.0 –9.7 
Croatia 0.0 3.4 –3.4 
Ireland – 0.1 –0.1 
Japan – 0.4 –0.4 
Yugoslavia – 0.1 –0.1 
Canada 0.0 0.4 –0.4 
Poland – 4.4 –4.4 
Liechtenstein – 0.4 –0.4 
Malta 19.6 – 19.6 
Moldova – 0.1 –0.1 
UK 0.1 0.6 –0.6 
Germany 4.6 49.3 –44.7 
Italy 0.2 0.5 –0.3 
Russia 0.0 11.1 –11.1 
Armenia – 0.1 –0.1 
Romania 7.4 16.9 –9.5 
Spain 0.2 1.8 –1.6 
Switzerland 6.4 1.0 5.4 
Sweden – 0.2 –0.2 
Slovak Republic – 299.9 –299.9 
Slovenia – 0.4 –0.4 
Ukraine – 2.2 –2.2 
International 
organizations – 6.4 –6.4 
TOTAL 53.9 675.2 –621.3 
Source: NBH. 
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As Table 4 shows, this included 
Є19.6 million from Malta, Є6.4 million 
from Switzerland, Є7.4 million from Ro-
mania and Є11.7 million from South Ko-
rea – the same amount that had been in-
vested there a year previously. 
In the first half of 2001, there was an 
important amount of investment (Є301 
million) directed towards Macedonia, 
due to the acquisition of the Macedonian 
telecom company MakTel by the Hun-
garian one MATÁV. The deal dominated 
OFDI flow last year, and the CEE region 
became the major target area in the geo-
graphical distribution of Hungarian 
OFDI once again. (As far as divestment 
in 2001 is concerned, Є11.8 million was 
withdrawn from Germany, and 6.3 mil-
lion and 46 million from Austria in 
March and December respectively.) For 
2002 the acquisition of the Slovak Inves-
ticna a Rozvojova Banka by the OTP 
Bank seems certain. 
Based on 1999–2000 data, some ink-
ling of the sectoral distribution of Hungar-
ian OFDI can be obtained. (Unfortu-
nately, there are no such data on OFDI 
stocks.) Table 5 shows that the bulk of the 
OFDI derives from the manufacturing 
sector, within which oil refining occupies 
an important place in both years, due to 
the investments by MOL. The second 
most important sector for OFDI is trade. 
Table 5 
Sectoral distribution of OFDI flows 
 
1999 2000 
Sector of parent (investor) Net equity capital 
(%) 
Manufacturing 63.3 64.0 
Wood, paper 2.7 2.2 
Refined petroleum 34.0 53.2 
Chemical products 7.4 6.8 
Electricity, gas 0.0 4.0 
Trade and repairs 6.9 19.7 
Hotels and restaurants 2.3 3.7 
Transports, communication 0.2 0.1 
Financial services 13.4 0.0* 
Real estate 2.9 4.1 
* Є7.3 million divestment in monetary services. 
Source: Own calculations from NBH data. 
If the OFDI flows are divided into 
EU and non-EU countries and the United 
States, a considerable EU/non-EU differ-
ence in structure becomes apparent. The 
trade and repairs sector dominates Hun-
gary’s OFDI to EU countries, while 
manufacturing leads to non-EU countries 
(Table 6). Concentration is a prominent 
feature of the investment in the EU, with 
93 per cent of the manufacturing capital 
going to Germany (mainly to wood and 
printing and to refined petroleum) and 
98 per cent of the trade-sector investment 
going to Denmark (the investment by 
Sara Lee, see Note 24).  
3. OFDI IN THE SERVICES 
Traditionally, services were considered 
to be domestically oriented and not liable 
to move across border. However, global-
ization and the rapid expansion of in-
formation and communication tech-
niques have brought rapid internation-
alization of services. Furthermore, in-
creased competition has forced govern-
Table 6 
Sectoral distribution of OFDI flows in 2000 
by region 
 
EU Non-EU US Sector of parent (investor) 
Net equity capital (%) 
Manufacturing 19.7 91.0 29.4 
Wood, paper 4.4 1.0 0.0 
Refined petroleum 8.2 80.4 9.9 
Chemical products 0.0 11.0 18.0 
Electricity, gas 0.0 6.4 40.9 
Trade and repairs 60.7 div. div. 
Hotels and restaurants 0.0 5.9 0.1 
Transports, communication 0.1 div. 3.3 
Financial services 8.4 1.7 5.7 
Real estate 100 100 100 
 Ger-
many 
Den-
mark EU 
Manufacturing 93.0 0.0 100 
Trade 0.5 98.0 100 
Source: Own calculations from NBH data. 
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ments to deregulate national sys-
tems of protection round the service 
sector. This liberalization has 
reached telecommunications, trans-
port, banking and other branches. 
Outward investment, as well as ex-
ports, now affects the service sec-
tors. Indeed the share of the services 
in the FDI flows among developed 
countries is rising (LICHTBLAU, 
2000). 
Increasing amounts of FDI 
flowed into the service, financial 
and real-estate segments in the CEE 
countries during the 1990s. In Hun-
gary’s case, 18.5 per cent of the FDI 
inflows in 2000 went to the trade 
and repair sector, 29.7 per cent to 
real estate and financial services, 
and 11.5 per cent to transport and 
telecommunications, making altogether 
62 per cent for the services.6 
Analysis of outward investment in 
the services is complicated by the lack of 
requisite data and information (STARE, 
2000). Macroeconomic OFDI data on ser-
vices are restricted to short periods and 
not broken down by sectors or countries. 
According to NBH data, the services ac-
count for about 25 per cent of Hungary’s 
outward investment in equity (Table 7). 
This consists mainly of OFDI in trade, 
but real estate and hotels and catering are 
also represented. The dominant destina-
tion was the EU (Denmark) in 2000. It 
should be noted that the sums invested 
are relatively small, so that one major 
investment can influence the sectoral and 
geographical distribution considerably. 
Some information additional to the 
macroeconomic data can be collected 
from firms and from the press. Based on 
these sources, it seems that some Hun-
garian service companies have made 
steps to expand into neighbouring coun-
tries in the last year or two. Here are 
some of the more significant instances. 
                                                 
6 NBH data. 
Danubius Hotels was privatized and 
introduced on the stock exchange in 
1993–4. CP Holdings, a British company, 
holds a majority stake, but there is also 
Hungarian, Israeli and American capital 
involved. In 1997–8, the firm was trans-
formed to a holding company. It owns 
15.1 per cent of all the hotel capacity in 
Hungary (most of it in 4-star hotels). Da-
nubius made its first foreign acquisition 
in 1999, when it paid USD 3.6 million for 
the Villa Butterfly at Marienské Lazné in 
the Czech Republic. This four-star hotel 
fulfilled expectations and became popu-
lar. As its next step, Danubius bought in 
May 2000 a 65 per cent share in Lecebné 
Lazné Marienské Lazné s.a, which runs 
the spa complex in the resort. It paid 
USD 16 million, half of it borrowed 
money.7 In 2001, Danubius (with 20 per 
cent) and three other companies estab-
lished Salina Invest Srl. in Romania, 
which acquired 82.17 per cent ownership 
of the Sovata spa centre (and use of the 
Medve Lake for 20 years). The venture 
undertook to invest a further USD 5 mil-
lion in the spa over the following two 
years.8 Danubius plans to expand further 
                                                 
7 Üzleti Hét (Business Week), July 3, 2000. 
8 Figyelő (Observer), No.33, August 2001. 
Table 7 
Sectoral distribution of Hungary’s 
OFDI flows in the services 
 
1999 2000 
HUF 
bn 
% HUF 
bn 
% 
 
Net equity capital 
Trade and repairs 4.17 6.9 32.27 19.7 
Hotels and restaurants 1.41 2.3 6.03 3.7 
Transports, communications 0.17 0.2 0.22 0.1 
 Transport 0.0 0.0 0.18 0.1 
  Communications 0.17 0.2 0.04 0.0 
Financial services 7.99 13.4 – 1.84 0.0 
 Monetary services 7.99 13.4 – 1.9 0.0 
 Insurance 0.00 0.0 0.07 0.0 
Real estate 1.73 2.9 6.83 4.1 
OFDI in services 15.5 25.9 43.5 26.5 
Total OFDI 59.7 100 163.7 100 
Source: NBH. 
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in the CEE countries, but decrease the 
number of its employees by 10 per cent. 
The company considers that the Hungar-
ian hotel market is saturated and there 
are many competitors, whereas obvious 
growth opportunities are available in the 
neighbouring countries. In February 2002 
Danubius gained the tender for the 67 
per cent of the Piestany spa complex in 
Slovakia. The price Danubius pays is 
USD 20 million with a promise to invest 
a further 13 million until 2006. The com-
plex has accommodations for 2700 per-
sons and, in general, 60 per cent of the 
foreign tourists visit it.9 
The Hungarian telecom group 
MATÁV headed a consortium that ac-
quired 51 per cent ownership of MakTel 
in the FYR Macedonia. The investment 
was financed by a loan from Deutsche 
Telekom, which owns a majority share in 
MATÁV, the payment of Є343 million be-
ing made mainly in January 2001. The 
investment offers a new market for 
MATÁV. Maktel holds a monopoly in the 
FYR Macedonia until 2005. It had 507,000 
fixed-line subscribers (25 per cent of the 
population) and 110,000 GSM mobile-
phone clients at the end of 2000 and it 
was also the leading Internet supplier in 
the country, with 10,000 accounts.10 This 
leaves important growth potential. 
MATÁV aims to spend an annual Є100 
million on its affiliate, increasing its sub-
scriber base, digitalizing lines, laying op-
tical cables, introducing new mobile tariff 
packages and the developing Internet 
service. (MakTel developed dynamically, 
reached 549,988 fixed line, 233,820 mobile 
and 21,674 Internet subscribers by De-
cember 31, 2001.) There are signs that 
MATÁV is also interested in the privatisa-
tion of Serbian and Bulgarian companies, 
                                                 
9 Napi Gazdaság (Daily Economy), February 18, 
2002. 
10 The information derives from a MATÁV press 
release in April 2001. 
as a further move towards regional ex-
pansion.11 
In June 2001,12 the leading personal 
bank in Hungary, OTP Bank, made an 
offer for the majority of the Slovak Inves-
ticná a Rozvojová Banka (IRB) which had 
been offered for privatization (70 per cent 
to be acquired from the state and 23 per 
cent from an insurance company). The 
price of USD 14 million is approximately 
equal to a quarter of OTP’s profits in 
2000, so that the acquisition can easily be 
financed. The Slovak company is a me-
dium-sized bank with 47 branches, a 3 
per cent market share and a portfolio of 
companies.13 This is the first step in a 
Central European strategy in which OTP 
intends to invest its considerable profits 
in neighbouring countries. The manage-
ment argues that OTP is better known in 
Slovakia than the bigger Western banks 
and the large indigenous Hungarian mi-
nority is also possible client. However, an 
OTP-owned IRB will have to prepare 
itself for fierce competition on the Slovak 
market with its Western rivals.14  
Another major Hungarian bank, 
MKB (Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank) also 
aspires to a regional role. It was among 
the few banks to retain its capital 
strength and financial stability over the 
transformation period. Privatization en-
sued in 1994–6, when the Bayerische 
Landesbank (BLB) acquired a majority 
stake. Subsequent capital injections and 
share transactions have left BLB Girozen-
trale of Munich with 89.27 per cent of 
MKB, Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft 
(BAWAG) of Vienna with 10.38 per cent 
and 0.35 per cent in the hands of others. 
MKB’s objective is to develop strongly in 
the CEE region, which is made easier by 
being part of the BLB group. MKB has 
                                                 
11
 MATÁV press release, August 14, 2001. 
12 Világgazdaság (World Economy), June 6, 2001. 
13 IRB also finances Slovnaft, which is an affiliate 
of the Hungarian fuels group MOL. 
14 Business Central Europe, May 2001. 
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three regional representative offices, in 
Bucharest, Bratislava and Ljubljana, and 
two banking subsidiaries. MKB owner-
ship of Convest Banka Zagreb rose to 100 
per cent in April 2001, while Interbanka 
Prague has been owned jointly since 1997 
by Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale 
(59 per cent), MKB (33 per cent) and 
BAWAG (8 per cent).15  
Quite important examples of OFDI 
exist in construction. The Hungarian con-
struction industry has been growing 
faster than GDP (it was 5.8 per cent in 
2000 and 9.9 per cent in 2001). There has 
been a steady increase in construction 
employment since 1997. Small and micro 
firms dominate in the branch, with 62 per 
cent of output deriving from firms with 
less than 50 employees. Internationally, 
the construction industry is considered 
inward looking, but Hungarian construc-
tion firms have established a foreign 
presence. The wholly Hungarian-owned 
KÉSZ group owns two firms in Yugosla-
via and established in 2001 a company in 
Romania (SC KÉSZ Srl) for construction 
projects. It plans a further one in Croatia. 
KÉSZ has 1100 employees, HUF 35 billion 
net sales and HUF 1.5 billion nominal 
capital in Hungary.16 A further construc-
tion related project is the renovation and 
functioning of the Rijeka Port, which is 
carried out by a majority Hungarian 
owned joint venture (49 per cent Croa-
tian), Ganz Port Rijeka Rt (established in 
September 1999). The company received 
a 33-year concession to build and use a 
terminal for storing 400-600 tons of soy 
and other agricultural products a year. 
The USD 28 million investment is due to 
end in 2003, and according to plans 60 
per cent of the subcontractors will be 
Hungarian firms. Ganz Port Rijeka also 
won another tender to renovate seven 
port cranes for USD 3 million, financed 
by the Croatian State. As far as infra-
structure is concerned, the modernisation 
                                                 
15 www.mkb.hu. 
16 Világgazdaság, September 2001. 
of the Budapest–Ploce railway line until 
2007, as part of the Fifth European Corri-
dor, is planned with the assistance of EIB 
and EBRD and EU funds. Similarly, the 
building of Budapest–Osiek–Rijeka mo-
torway is being planned. Electrosoft 
Holding from Hungary and the Hargita 
Council have established a joint venture 
in Romania (Hargita-Gaz) to install gas 
lines. The reconstruction and re-building 
in the neighbouring area will certainly 
enhance the outward investment activity 
of Hungarian construction firms in the 
future. 
4. FDI, OFDI AND HUNGARY’S 
NET INVESTMENT POSITION 
Economic openness is essential in a small 
country without significant natural re-
sources. Small economies tend to be 
more internationalized than large 
economies, and therefore more influ-
enced by external factors. Hungary’s de-
gree of openness increased considerably 
in the 1990s. Quantitative restrictions of 
trade were abolished, customs tariffs 
were reduced, and trade in industrial 
products with the EU and CEFTA was 
freed. The proportion of exports to GDP 
in 2000 was 61 per cent and that of im-
ports to GDP 70 per cent, while exports 
per capita reached USD 2797.17 
Table 8 shows the degree of open-
ness in selected small European countries 
(and Poland). Except for Ireland and Es-
tonia, with their extreme degrees of 
openness, Slovakia and Hungary are the 
most open countries in terms of their for-
eign trade/GDP ratios. Austria and Slo-
venia show much higher exports per cap-
ita than Hungary, whose figure is similar 
to those of Portugal and the Czech Re-
public. With inward and outward FDI 
stock/per capita, the EU members in the 
                                                 
17 Based on CSO data. 
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table are well ahead of the transition 
countries. The difference in openness 
between small and large countries is ex-
emplified by the figures for Poland. 
The effects of FDI on small coun-
tries can be greater than those on large 
ones and generally include trade aug-
mentation (CASTELLO et al., 1997). Small 
countries are more dependent on inward 
investment in their early stages of devel-
opment and then become more strongly 
oriented towards outward investment. 
FDI can help small countries to overcome 
economic constraints, bring them new 
contacts and markets, obtain them access 
to new technologies, and promote further 
openness.18 Small, open economies are 
generally dominated by a handful of big 
firms and numerous small firms 
(HOGENBIRK AND NARULA, 1999), with 
big-firm activity determinant. This ap-
plies also to Hungary, where three mul-
tinationals (Audi, IBM and Philips) ac-
                                                 
18 Bellak (1997) points out that the small CEE 
countries have a long-term interest in inward 
FDI. They can import technology via multina-
tional corporations, which can be applied in a 
flexible way by small domestic firms as well. 
Furthermore, productivity increases and favour-
able location factors create an appropriate envi-
ronment for multinationals to outsource and sub-
contract. It is apparent today that the activity of 
large, well-capitalized multinationals has tied the 
CEE countries into the globalization process. 
count for 18.3 per cent of total manufac-
turing net sales and 34 per cent of total 
manufacturing exports.19 
The 1990s in Hungary can be di-
vided into two periods in terms of the 
macroeconomic flows of FDI and OFDI. 
Up to 1996, Hungary was receiving rela-
tively large amounts of FDI, with signifi-
cant year-by-year fluctuations (Figure 1). 
These fluctuations were connected with 
certain large privatization deals, such as 
the sale of the telecom service provider 
(1993) and much of the energy sector 
(1995). OFDI, on the other hand, was al-
most non-existent in this first period. 
The second period started after 
1996. The fluctuations in inward FDI 
ceased, leaving a stable flow of about 
Є1.6 billion a year. Meanwhile OFDI be-
gan to grow. However, it should be 
borne in mind that the inward FDI flows 
remain considerably greater (about 1.7 
times as high), because of reinvested 
profits. Despite promises to this effect, 
the NBH has failed so far to publish rein-
vestment figures, so that the figures for 
Hungary’s FDI flows are not comparable 
with those of neighbouring countries. 
The significance of FDI in the Hun-
garian economy is unquestionable. It is 
                                                 
19 If GE, Flextronics and GM are added, the pro-
portions rise to 23.4 per cent and 42 per cent. 
(Own calculations based on Figyelő Top 200.) 
Table 8 
Openness and FDI in selected countries in 2000 
 
 Exports/GDP 
(%) 
Imports/GDP 
(%) 
Exports per 
capita (USD) 
FDI stock per 
capita (USD) 
OFDI stock per 
capita (USD) 
Portugal 23.5 36.9 2474 2656 1735 
Ireland 78.0 50.8 19301 16905 4866 
Austria 33.8 35.2 7927 3489 2569 
Czech Republic 58.5 65.0 2820 1947 163 
Slovakia 61.7 70.0 2189 690 59 
Slovenia 48.6 54.5 4433 1510 401 
Hungary 61.0 70.0 2797 1988 199 
Estonia 63.1 85.7 2014 2640 173 
Poland 30.8 19.9 819 830 38.6 
Sources: Own calculations from IMF, OECD and national balance-of-payments statistics. 
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very high by international standards, if 
the FDI stock/GDP ratio is taken as the 
measure, for example. Table 9 shows that 
Hungary has by far the highest share of 
FDI stock/GDP of any CEE country.20 
Compared with the EU countries in the 
table, Portugal and Austria have much 
smaller shares and Ireland a much higher 
one. The role of foreign investor firms is 
extremely significant in the Hungarian 
economy. In 1999, foreign investors ac-
counted for 88 per cent of exports by 
Hungarian manufacturing, 71 per cent of 
the value added, 72 per cent of the nomi-
nal capital, and 47 per cent of the em-
ployment.21 
According to several authors, the 
level of FDI and net investment position 
of a country can bring about a certain 
development level. The ‘investment de-
velopment path’ (IDP) theory introduced 
by Dunning (1981) assumes an associa-
tion between a country’s level of devel-
opment (GDP/capita) and its 
international investment (net 
FDI) position. The main as-
sumption is that as a country 
develops, the conditions for 
domestic and foreign firms 
change, affecting the flows of 
inward and outward FDI. 
However, FDI affects the eco-
nomic structure as well, so 
that there is a dynamic inter-
action between the two. IDP 
theory classifies countries in 
four main groups correspond-
ing to four stages of develop-
ment. (1) There is almost no 
inward and outward FDI. The domestic 
market is very small, the infrastructure 
inadequate and the labour force mainly 
unskilled. There are insufficient location-
specific advantages offered. The devel-
opment through local policies of some 
location advantages (such as infrastruc-
ture) leads to (2), which is characterized 
                                                 
20 Only the Baltic state of Estonia has the much 
higher share of 53.2 per cent. 
21 CSO data. 
by more inward investment, mainly 
aimed to the domestic market. Outward 
investment is still very little and domes-
tic firms lack ownership advantages. (3) 
The growth of inward FDI becomes less 
pronounced, but OFDI increases, so that 
the net inward investment per capita 
starts to fall. Domestic firms become 
more competitive and stronger in domes-
tic and international markets. (4) These 
trends give countries a net outward-
investor position. The ownership advan-
tages of domestic firms are strong and 
they have an increasing propensity to 
exploit them internally in a foreign, 
rather than a domestic location. Intra-
industrial trade grows with the increas-
ing similarity to other countries’ eco-
nomic structures. It follows from this 
theory that the graph of the net outward-
investment curve is U or J shaped where 
the countries’ GDP per capita appears on 
the X coordinate.22 
 
The analysis by Dunning (1981) is 
based on cross-sectional country data. It 
is more difficult to fit the general theory 
of IDP to a specific country with long 
                                                 
22 Later a fifth stage was included in the theory, 
characterized by high cross-border trade within 
multinational companies, converging economic 
structures of countries, and more balanced inter-
national direct-investment positions. (See Dun-
ning and Narula, 1996.) 
Table 9 
Stock of inward FDI as a percentage of GDP 
 
 1990 1994 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Hungary* 1.7 15.6 26.7 34.7 38.5 39.9 43.2 
Slovenia 3.8 2.2 9.4 12.1 14.7 15.3 16.1 
Czech Republic 4.3 9.9 16.4 22.8 23.9 31.8 36.4 
Slovakia 0.6 5.6 7.2 8.2 9.5 10.8 19.3 
Poland 0.2 5.3 6.2 11.6 15.8 18.3 20.1 
Estonia 5.2 30.5 20.2 24.5 35.6 47.9 53.2 
Portugal 14 6.6 17.8 17.7 19.7 20.0 23.8 
Austria 6.2 7.1 7.6 8.6 11.3 11.8 14.8 
Ireland 12.2 10.3 18.2 23.3 28.1 47.0 67.0 
* Reinvested earnings are not registered. 
Sources: UNCTAD World Investment Report 1999, WIIW statistics, 
and balance-of-payments data of central banks. 
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time-series data, because of country-
specific factors that influence FDI.23 The 
extent of the causality between FDI and 
GDP is not treated in the theory; the two 
trends are simply juxtaposed. Attempts 
to apply IDP theory to specific countries 
have been made by several authors. 
Bellak and Svetlicic (2001) puts the 
question whether small and transi-
tion countries are different from 
large and not transition countries 
regarding the IDP theory. The ex-
ample is Austria and Slovenia, 
based on which the authors find 
that both patterns are different from 
the ideal investment development 
path. Transition seems to be more a 
country-specific reason for that than 
smallness.  
In the case of Hungary, Figure 
1 shows the development of out-
ward FDI and the net investment 
position, along with the recent in-
crease in the flows of OFDI. Figure 2 
presents the net outward invest-
ment position (NOIP) of 
Hungary, which means 
the difference between 
the FDI and OFDI stocks 
per capita and the trend 
in per capita GDP. The 
recent upward trend in 
OFDI suggests that Hun-
gary is beginning the 
third stage of IDP. Apart 
from the aggregate 
macro level IDP, a bilat-
eral and sectoral IDP can 
be calculated (BELLAK, 
2001). The first concept 
reflects a country’s NOIP 
in relation to another 
                                                 
23 Buckley and Castro (1998), for example, con-
cluded after analysing the Portuguese case that 
careful observation of the individual elements 
behind IDP is necessary. Integration (joining to 
EFTA and the EU) and political factors (the end of 
dictatorship, changes in Central Europe) could be 
more important to the generation of inward and 
outward FDI than domestic growth. 
country, while the second shows the po-
sition of an industry compared with all 
its competitors abroad. Such calculations 
for Hungary are hindered by the lack of 
proper stock and time-series data, but 
experience and the existing data suggest 
that bilateral IDP would be rather differ-
ent for Romania and Germany, as the 
NOIP is positive in the former case and 
strongly negative in the latter. There may 
also be sectoral differences. The NOIP of 
the oil sector, for example, is probably 
less negative than that of other indus-
tries. 
Figure 1 
Inward and outward flows of direct investment in Hungary
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Figure 2 
Net outward investment position (NOIP) 
and GDP per capita (constant prices) 
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FDI inflows affect OFDI as well. 
Outward investment may derive from 
domestic companies (direct investment), 
but also from affiliates of foreign-
controlled companies and multinationals 
(indirect investment), which establishes a 
link between FDI and OFDI. As Altzinger 
and Bellak (1999) claim, if a foreign par-
ent makes the investment decisions, the 
local affiliate is affected only marginally. 
A bigger impact on the investing firm 
(for instance on employment) can be ex-
pected with direct investment. The au-
thors performed regression analysis on 
survey data from 112 direct and 38 indi-
rect Austrian investor firms. These gave 
the result that wage costs play a stronger 
role and employment effects are greater 
with direct OFDI, which is strongly asso-
ciated with relocation of labour-intensive 
activities. 
Statistical analyses often set the 
general dividing line between indirect 
and direct investment simply by the de-
gree of foreign ownership (over 10 or 50 
per cent). The authors take the view that 
indirect OFDI should be defined as an 
investment deriving from a firm in which 
control is foreign, so that strategic deci-
sions are taken abroad. This is important, 
because even a simple majority of foreign 
ownership is not enough to class OFDI as 
indirect if the strategic decisions are be-
ing taken within the domestic firm. In the 
Hungarian case, the state has retained a 
‘gold share’ in some big companies that 
have made important outward invest-
ments (such as MOL and MATÁV), even 
though the majority of their stock is for-
eign owned. 
The lack of data on Hungarian ex-
periences makes it difficult to analyse or 
even distinguish direct and indirect 
OFDI. Certainly, a proportion of the 
outward investment must be realized by 
foreign affiliates functioning in Hungary, 
but in the author’s estimation, this is still 
not a significant proportion. Most multi-
national affiliates are export-oriented 
companies (oriented towards the EU) or 
designed to serve the domestic/regional 
market. Nonetheless, there are some 
cases that can be considered as indirect 
FDI.24 
Apart from the factors already men-
tioned, analysing or detecting indirect 
investment is difficult in the CEE coun-
tries without knowing the history of the 
companies concerned. In some cases, 
Hungarian companies that were impor-
tant or even leaders in their sector made 
investments abroad as early as the 1970s 
and 1980s (establishing trade or produc-
tion affiliates), thereby creating a net-
work in neighbouring countries. There 
are examples in Hungary and other CEE 
countries of a foreign investor buying 
such a firm with its network during the 
privatization process, so that the OFDI 
preceded the FDI.  
                                                 
24 Three recent examples of OFDI by foreign af-
filiates in Hungary have involved Dunapack (pa-
per and packaging), Swiss-based Phoenix Mecano, 
and Sara Lee Hungary (tea and coffee). 
 Dunapack, 100 per cent owned by the 
Austrian firm Prinzhorn, was an important Hun-
garian enterprise with considerable market share 
and production before privatization. The Hun-
garian subsidiary was deemed weighty enough 
for Prinzhorn to make it a Central European cen-
tre for expansion and investment further East. A 
major factor was the relative proximity of the 
Hungarian subsidiary to target countries, so that 
transport costs would be lower. Investments were 
made in Romania (1994), Ukraine (1998) and Po-
land (1998), partly to follow existing customers. 
 Phoenix Mecano, which makes electrical 
machinery, plastic and other machine parts and 
mobile phones at a greenfield factory in Southern 
Hungary, attained sales of HUF 18 billion and 
increased profits in 2000. The parent decided to 
increase production capacity in Hungary and 
expand from there into Romania and Slovakia 
(Világgazdaság, February 1, 2001). 
 Sara Lee Hungary is an affiliate of the 
Dutch multinational Sara Lee/Douwe Egberts, 
which decided in 2000 to increase the base capital 
of the Hungarian affiliate by HUF 26.8 billion. 
After that, Sara Lee Hungary invested HUF 35.4 
billion in founding a trade-investment company 
in Denmark. This investment was a simply tax-
reducing measure by the parent and cannot be 
considered ‘real’ indirect OFDI. 
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Other factors besides ownership 
structure that can be crucial to outward 
investment include size. The size of a 
firm seems to have an impact on its in-
ternationalization. Smaller firms have 
fewer financial resources and personnel, 
less knowledge, etc. Larger firms interna-
tionalize more rapidly than smaller ones. 
The combined size-ownership criteria in 
Table 10 distinguish six groups of firms. 
Groups differ strongly in their in-
volvement in outward investment. In 
Hungarian experience, the most active is 
D1, followed by F2 and F3. D1 (the most 
significant in the sums invested and the 
number of affiliates) includes large do-
mestically controlled companies that are 
quoted on the stock exchange.25 Zalak-
erámia (ceramics), Gedeon Richter 
(pharmaceuticals), MOL, TVK (oil refin-
ing), Gardénia (textiles), Graboplast 
(plastics) and MATÁV (telecom) can be 
cited as examples. F2 covers companies 
that are owned by a foreign professional 
investor, mainly interested in the domes-
tic and regional market. They may be 
production companies or service provid-
ers. Examples include Dunapack (see 
Note 24), Egis (pharmaceuticals), Délhús 
(meat) and the MKB (see Section 3). To F3 
belong firms with a mixed ownership 
structure, whose owners are mainly insti-
tutional or financial investors. They make 
considerable export sales, but they are 
also interested in the domestic market. 
Cost reduction can be an important mo-
                                                 
25 This applies even if there is significant or ma-
jority foreign ownership of the equity. 
tive for OFDI in their case. F1 consists 
mainly of multinational affiliates inter-
ested in exporting to the EU (IBM, Phil-
ips, etc.) They are rarely interested in 
making OFDI from Hungary. An excep-
tion may be the Swiss-owned Phoenix 
Mecano (see Note 24). D3 is made up of 
small and micro-firms without enough 
capital to expand abroad. They aim to 
serve only the domestic market. 
Hungarian experience suggests that 
the divide between investors and non-
investors abroad is not foreign or Hun-
garian ownership, but capital strength 
and the existence of ownership advan-
tages and a proper strategy. 
5. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE SURVEY 
In view of the shortcomings of the data 
on OFDI, the authors carried out a sur-
vey of companies designed to allow the 
motives, patterns and effects to be as-
sessed more closely. The best approach 
would have been to consult a list of all 
the firms that have carried out OFDI. 
(Such a list exists only at the NBH, where 
the competent department refused to 
release it.) Instead, information was col-
lected from ministry and ITD officers and 
representatives at home and in 
neighbouring countries. This yielded a 
list of 57 companies, which were sent 
questionnaires. In the end, 22 of the firms 
Table 10 
Groups of companies by ownership and size 
 
 Foreign control Domestic control 
Large F1. Multinational affiliates, producing 
mainly for export; global decision-
making 
D1. Export and domestic market oriented 
‘big firms’ (oil, foods, services) 
Me-
dium 
F2.Domestic market oriented producing 
and service firms, global decisions 
D2. SMEs, export oriented, often in-
volved in outward processing trade 
Small F3.Export and domestic market oriented 
SMEs, strategic decisions in Hungary 
D3. Small and micro firms, domestically 
oriented 
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responded by sending back the ques-
tionnaire, but even in their case, certain 
questions remained unanswered, in most 
cases ones that referred to data about 
affiliates. 
The sample consisted mainly of 
‘big’ companies, many of them quoted on 
the stock exchange. According to the 
group structure of Table 10, 12 respon-
dents can be said to belong to D1, 5 to 
D2, 1 to D3, 2 to F1 and 2 to F2. The sizes 
of the companies in the sample are pre-
sented in Table 11. 
Table 11 
Main characteristics of the firms 
in the sample 
 
Sample average: 1997 2000 
Fixed assets (HUF bn) 59.6 91.6 
Nominal capital (HUF bn) 15.1 16.9 
Net sales (HUF bn) 66.3 103.5 
Exports (HUF bn) 17.2 31.7 
No. of employees 4157 3964 
Export/sales 38.9 42.6 
No. of affiliates 2.7 3.8 
No. of employees: Sample Economy*
–9 0.0 92.3 
10–49 9.0 6.1 
50–249 0.0 1.3 
250–499 18.2 0.2 
500– 72.8 0.1 
Note: * Based on CSO data for 2000. 
 
Table 11 confirms that the firms in 
the sample tend to be large. Compared 
with the Hungarian economy, firms em-
ploying over 500 people are heavily over-
represented in the survey. The main rea-
son for this is that firms are mainly older 
companies, founded in the communist 
era or earlier. (The mean foundation year 
of the antecedents of the firms in the 
sample was 1937.) They have undergone 
conversion (into a joint-stock company, 
for example) and privatization at the be-
ginning of the 1990s. 
Looking at their main financial data 
in the period 1997–2000, the firms in the 
sample reduced their labour force some-
what, but they were able to increase their 
capital and assets, and still more their 
sales. Increasing internationalization was 
seen in increases in exports and the aver-
age number of affiliates. The export in-
tensity of the firms (defined as ex-
ports/net sales) also increased, but re-
mained far from strong. (The sample 
shows a wide dispersion, with export 
intensity ranging from 4.8 to 73 per cent.) 
Eighty-one per cent of the firms in 
the sample had foreign ownership, with 
more than 50 per cent foreign ownership 
in 61 per cent of them. (The share of firms 
with a foreign stake in the whole econ-
omy is only 10 per cent, but it should be 
borne in mind that the domestic firms 
also include many micro and even 
pseudo-firms. (See the lower part of Ta-
ble 11.) The share of majority foreign-
owned firms among firms in which there 
is foreign investment is 79 per cent in the 
whole economy, which is somewhat 
greater than the proportion in the sam-
ple. However, majority foreign owner-
ship does not necessarily mean foreign 
control. Most of the firms in the sample 
were domestically controlled. The inves-
tors came mainly from the EU (77.3 per 
cent) and the United States (18.2 per 
cent). 
All the companies in the sample 
were in manufacturing except for one in 
the services. There were 5 companies in 
rubber and plastics, 4 in food and bever-
ages, 3 in machinery and electronics, 2 
each in the pharmaceutical, oil, and 
wood and paper industries, and 1 each in 
textiles, agriculture and ceramics. 
It was expected that there would be 
a link between exports and OFDI activ-
ity: earlier trade contacts would enhance 
foreign investment. This proved to be the 
case. The geographical distributions of 
foreign affiliates and of exports (Figure 3) 
show similar patterns, although the share 
of the EU is higher in exports. On aver-
age, 57 per cent of the exports of the 
firms in the sample were directed to the 
EU, 23.4 per cent to CEE countries, and 
10.5 per cent to CIS countries. 
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Figure 3 
Geographical distribution of exports and 
foreign affiliates of sample companies 
0
20
40
60
EU
CEE
CIS
Other
Distribution of affiliates (22)
Distribution of exports (18)
Note: Valid answers in parentheses. 
 
The proportions for affiliates were 
34.2 per cent in the EU, 35.4 per cent in 
CEE countries, 7.6 per cent in the CIS, 
and 13.9 per cent in other countries (Cy-
prus, the United States and the UK). 
Other features of the respondent compa-
nies included an average of 2.4 per cent 
spent on R and D. Here the two pharma-
ceutical companies were exceptional with 
6–7 per cent, while others spent between 
0.8 and 1.8 per cent. The average propor-
tion of graduate employees was 14.6 per 
cent in 1997 and 15.5 per cent in 2000. 
The average amount invested in a foreign 
affiliate was HUF 169.6 million in 1997 
and HUF 8877 million in 2000. The total 
invested was HUF 133.1 billion; the 15 
respondents in the sample accounted for 
52 per cent of all Hungarian OFDI.26 In 
this respect, the sample was quite repre-
sentative. 
Turning to the affiliates, the survey 
asked about the two most important at 
                                                 
26 OFDI (acquisition of equity capital) from Hun-
gary was HUF 255.8 billion in the period exam-
ined (the year 2000 and January 2001). 
each respondent company. Not all re-
spondents gave answers to these ques-
tions, however, and some had only one 
affiliate, so that information was gath-
ered about altogether 34 affiliates. Of 
these, 12 were in Romania, 4 in Germany, 
3 in Ukraine, 2 in Slovakia, 2 in Croatia, 2 
in Russia, and 1 each in FYR Macedonia, 
Denmark, the United States, the UK, the 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, Aus-
tria, and France. Thus, 25 were in the 
neighbouring region and 9 in the EU or 
the United States. Sales and marketing 
were the activity of 15 and production of 
19. All affiliates in the West were for 
trading the products of parent compa-
nies. There were 6 trading affiliates in the 
CEE region, the rest being for produc-
tion. The form of 85.3 per cent was a lim-
ited company, while the rest took the 
form of a joint stock company (PLC). 
Many respondents failed to provide re-
quested data on the affiliates (sales, capi-
tal, trade etc.). Only features mentioned 
relatively often are mentioned here. The 
data for affiliates in 2000 appear in Table 
12. 
Table 12 
Main characteristics of foreign affiliates 
 
Average No. of responses 2000 
No. of employees (18) 808 
Fixed assets (USD mn) (20) 83 
Own capital (USD mn) (18) 39 
Sales (USD mn) (18) 140 
Exports (USD mn) (12) 118 
 
The exports of the affiliates were di-
rected mainly (67 per cent of exports) to 
nearby markets. The second largest des-
tination was the EU (17 per cent), while 
exports to the home country represented 
7 per cent, to the CEE countries 5 per cent 
and to other regions 2 per cent. 
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6. FORMS OF ENTRY INTO 
FOREIGN MARKETS 
It has become essential for companies to 
appear in foreign markets and interna-
tionalize themselves. This gradual proc-
ess of developing international business 
makes a firm become increasingly com-
mitted to and involved in international 
business operations, through specific 
products in selected markets 
(LUOSTARINEN, 1994). According to the 
‘Uppsala model’ (see, for instance, 
JOHANSON AND VAHLNE, 1977, and 
LUOSTARINEN, 1978), firms follow typical 
stages of internationalization: (i) export-
ing, (ii) establishment a foreign sales sub-
sidiary, (iii) licensing or subcontracting, 
and (iv) establishment of a foreign pro-
duction subsidiary. The same school de-
fined factors of ‘domestic push’ (small-
ness, openness, peripheral location) and 
‘international pull’ (large, open foreign 
markets) for internationalization. 
The ‘stage’ pattern of internation-
alization has been criticized from certain 
points of view. The first is the sequence 
of stages. In reality, companies may stop 
at a certain stage, jump stages, or even 
reverse the process for various external 
and internal reasons. According to Reu-
ber and Fisher (1997), for example, firms 
with internationally experienced man-
agement may skip the first two stages. 
Management is a kind of resource, which 
promotes greater internationalization. 
The second line of criticism is that the 
empirical evidence for the model was 
based on a limited number of Scandina-
vian firms. The third aspect considered 
was the difficulty of operationalization of 
a model influenced by so many factors. 
To assist in this respect, Cavusgil (1980) 
constructed an ‘I model’, in which export 
involvement is operationalized by the 
export/sales ratio, to reflect the firm’s 
dependence on foreign markets. This was 
later applied by other authors (such as 
GANKEMA et al., 2000) to small and me-
dium-sized enterprises (SMEs), where 
evidence was found of ‘stagnation’ (lin-
gering at a stage), ‘over-progression’ and 
‘hyper-progression’ (jumping stages).  
Despite the theoretic debates, there 
is no doubt that investing abroad is vital 
in the present era of globalization. Blom-
ström and Kokko (2000) concludes that 
multinationals have no alternative but to 
continue expanding abroad. They cannot 
retain their international market shares in 
the long run without foreign production. 
This applies increasingly to SMEs and 
companies in the CEE countries as well. 
Many ventures in the 1980s began 
to sell and invest abroad earlier than was 
typical of similar firms, bypassing the 
traditional pattern of internationaliza-
tion. Some of this ‘premature’ interna-
tionalization was impelled by multina-
tionals to which the investors were sup-
pliers, but not all. Also associated with 
early internationalization are clear prod-
uct differentiation and internationally 
experienced managers. Although it is a 
risky procedure, firms may manage their 
international risks by trading off risk fac-
tors against each other (SHRADER, OVIATT 
AND MCDOUGALL, 2000). 
Recently, interest has turned to-
wards a relatively new type of firm, the 
‘born globals’. These are newly estab-
lished, small to medium-sized firms that 
face globalization from the outset, due to 
their product and processing specializa-
tions. Such firms have to start domestic 
and international operations simultane-
ously, or even foreign operations first, 
and do not follow any kind of stage de-
velopment. They are mainly found in 
knowledge-intensive industries (ALMOR, 
2000), where they play an important role 
as suppliers worldwide. 
The choice of market-entry mode is 
influenced by several factors. As Pan and 
Tse (2000) shows, there exists a hierarchy 
among the various modes. The first level 
in this hierarchy distinguishes between 
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equity and non-equity entry modes. Eq-
uity modes (wholly or jointly owned af-
filiates) require a major resource com-
mitment and investment risks are higher. 
Non-equity modes (contractual agree-
ment and exports) do not call for the es-
tablishment of an independent organiza-
tion. After the decision on the first level, 
firms consider factors on a second level 
(degree of ownership, contract or export, 
etc.). Location and host-country factors 
influence decisions on the first level 
rather than the second. 
With Hungarian companies, the 
general tendency is to follow the stages of 
internationalization. The first step is to 
create branch offices and warehouses 
abroad. (This was done in the 1970s and 
1980s in several cases.) These can help in 
gathering information about the host 
country, the regulatory system, market 
needs, etc. Afterwards comes the step of 
setting up trading firms and finally pro-
duction firms. Typical examples of this 
behaviour pattern have been the Hungar-
ian pharmaceutical companies (ANTA-
LÓCZY, 2000) 
In terms of entry modes, there are 
two basic forms of investments. The first 
is greenfield investment by a Hungarian 
firm (or jointly with another firm). The 
second is acquisition of an existing firm 
(utilizing, for example, the privatization 
opportunities in neighbouring countries.) 
However, there is in a sense a third form: 
buying or renting real estate (empty 
building or land) and ‘filling’ it with the 
company’s own machinery and equip-
ment.27 
The proportion of greenfield affili-
ates to acquired firms in the survey was 
40 per cent to 60 per cent, so that acquisi-
tion was more popular. However, the 
sample was biased towards big, well-
                                                 
27 There was a case where a Hungarian pharma-
ceutical company bought a Polish textile factory, 
stripped it and brought in its own machines to 
package products from the parent company 
(Antalóczy, 2000). 
capitalized companies, so that the share 
of acquisition is probably higher in the 
general pattern. Companies find 
greenfield investment riskier and costlier 
than buying an existing firm. Almost the 
half the greenfield affiliates were trading 
firms, as opposed to only 36 per cent of 
the acquired firms, of which the majority 
were producers. The vast majority of the 
affiliates (85.3 per cent) operated under 
the legal form of a private limited com-
pany. None of the respondent firms op-
erated abroad with a licence or franchise 
agreement. 
The findings of the survey confirm 
previous experiences that Hungarian in-
vestors seek a controlling interest in their 
affiliates: 41 per cent of those cited in the 
sample were 100 per cent owned by the 
Hungarian investor, 32 per cent majority 
owned and 12 per cent 50 per cent 
owned. Obtaining control was seen as a 
way to reduce the risks of investment. 
7. COMPANY STRATEGIES AND 
MOTIVATIONS 
As in other spheres, the Hungarian com-
pany sector abroad is far from homoge-
nous. Firms have different aims, activi-
ties, ownership structures, sizes etc., and 
their motives or strategies in investing 
abroad differ as well. The well-known 
framework applied in Dunning (1993) 
described four main motives for foreign 
investment: market seeking, efficiency 
seeking, strategic-asset seeking and re-
source seeking. These also fit the motives 
of Hungarian companies investing 
abroad. However, in most cases the rea-
son for the investment is a complex one 
involving more than one motive. 
The authors see seven main reasons 
why Hungarian firms invest abroad: 1. 
market share, 2. cost reduction, 3. com-
pany growth, 4. resource seeking, 5. tariff 
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jumping and tax regulations, 6. offshore 
tax avoidance, and 7. ‘follow the cus-
tomer’. 
Market share plays an important role 
in almost all investments. The prospects 
of increasing domestic market share be-
came weak in the second half of the 
1990s, due to stronger competition, 
which had been enhanced by the trade-
liberalization measures and the activities 
of foreign-owned companies. An increase 
in sales can be achieved by establishing a 
trading company or production unit in 
another country. Following customers is 
a related motive. Certain companies fol-
low a domestic multinational partner 
into a neighbouring country to supply it 
there. 
Cost reduction, it is generally be-
lieved, can be one of the most important 
motives for investing abroad. The CEE 
region has been attractive from this point 
of view. Labour costs differ among CEE 
countries, being higher in the ‘central’ 
countries than the ‘eastern’ ones. Cost 
reduction can be an important motive for 
Hungarian companies to invest in Bul-
garia, Romania or the CIS countries. 
However, the quality of labour (qualifica-
tion, discipline, and mentality) counts 
strongly alongside labour costs. Another 
cost reason for investing in a neighbour-
ing country may be lower transport costs.  
Company growth is an important ele-
ment of strategy for bigger companies, 
connected with gaining market shares 
and rivalry with competitors. Some firms 
aim for a leading market position in the 
CEE region. The best example is MOL, 
which has declared its intention of be-
coming a regional multinational. Com-
pany growth is essential for firms quoted 
on the stock exchange, as a way of in-
creasing share values (ANTALÓCZY et al., 
2000). 
Resource seeking is not the most im-
portant reason for Hungarian companies, 
although in certain fields (petroleum, 
natural gas, etc.), ex-Soviet regions or 
countries rich in minerals may be a target 
for Hungarian investors.28 
Tariffs and tax regulations are still 
important in the CEE region, so that 
avoidance can be a pertinent motive for 
investors. Capital contributions in kind 
are exempt from VAT in most countries 
and customs duties and intra-firm deliv-
eries are favourably regulated. Romania, 
Moldavia and Ukraine form a customs 
union with the CIS countries, so that es-
tablishing an affiliate in these countries 
gives Hungarian firms preferential access 
to the Russian market. An additional mo-
tive is to exploit special local tax and 
other regulations more favourable than 
those in Hungary (ANTALÓCZY et al., 
2000). 
Tax evasion and founding off shore 
firms is a good reason to invest in some 
‘Western’ territories such as Cyprus, 
Malta, Jersey and the Netherlands Antil-
les. It has been seen that these have taken 
important shares of Hungary’s OFDI. (Of 
course, it is not known which companies 
lie behind the transfers.) 
In Hungary’s case, the ‘follow the 
customer’ strategy of serving a domestic 
                                                 
28 MOL has reserve acquisition objectives in 
Western Siberia. The aim is to implement attrac-
tive field development projects under a produc-
tion-sharing partnership with Russian oil compa-
nies. MOL has a joint Siberian project with Yukos, 
a major Russian oil company, for joint develop-
ment of the Zapadno-Maloblyk field, which has 
about 24 million tonnes (175 million barrels) of 
proven reserves and is located in the Khanty-
Mansysk Autonomous Region of Western Siberia. 
The area has an extensive pipeline and transpor-
tation infrastructure. Under the agreement, the 
parties will form a consortium with 50–50 par-
ticipation. Under Russian law, a production-
sharing agreement defines the rights and obliga-
tions of the investors and the state for a period of 
20 years, assuring stability. The law guarantees 
full export rights, bookkeeping and accounting in 
foreign currency, profit repatriation without limi-
tations, and fixed tax rates. During 2000, a feasi-
bility study for the project was completed and 
approval obtained from the local-government 
authority. 
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partner already present abroad 
(LUOSTARINEN, 1994) probably applies 
primarily to firms in the services and 
banks, although there is not much evi-
dence available to support this. The in-
vestments of Dunapack (see Note 24) 
have motives of this kind. 
The motivating factors were 
grouped as follows in the questionnaire: 
market-related motives (market size, 
growth), labour costs, other cost-related 
motives (cheaper inputs, transport costs, 
taxes, tariffs), and acquisitions of strate-
gic assets (trade marks, technologies). 
The responses show that by far the most 
important motive for OFDI by Hungar-
ian firms is to obtain or increase market 
shares (see Figure 4). This was taken to be 
very important by 82 per cent of the re-
sponding firms. The second most impor-
tant group of motives were the strategic 
factors (31.8 per cent thought them very 
important and 59 per cent important.) 
Cost-related motives seem to be much 
less significant. 
The findings of the survey coincide with 
those of other surveys about inward FDI 
motives into Hungary (e.g. ÉLTETŐ AND 
SASS, 1998), where market access likewise 
proved to be the most important motive. 
In this respect, Hungarian firms as inves-
tors are behaving like Western compa-
nies in their OFDI decisions. 
Intense domestic competition can also 
induce companies to look abroad. The 
following question was therefore in-
cluded in the questionnaire: ‘Are new 
affiliates a response to the investment 
strategies of a close competitor or 
competitors in your industry?’ This 
indeed proved to be an important factor, 
as 63.4 per cent of the companies 
answered in the affirmative. The average 
number of key players competing with 
the sample companies was 7. The 
transformation to a market economy 
considerably increased competition for 
domestic firms during the 1990s and they 
had to accustom themselves to this. 
Expansion abroad could be seen as a way 
of strengthening the company’s position. 
Once a company has 
sufficient motives for invest-
ing abroad, it has to collect as 
much information on the host 
countries as possible. The 
questionnaire enquired about 
where firms obtained the 
information before investing 
abroad. Interestingly, all the 
respondents ticked ‘personal 
contacts’. Such contacts may 
result from previous trading 
activity or business partner-
ships. Other significant 
sources of information – 
banks (7 respondents), cham-
bers of commerce (3), minis-
tries (2) and other govern-
mental organizations (2) – 
proved to be of much less 
importance. 
Figure 4 
The main motives of the sample companies 
for investing abroad 
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8. THE EFFECTS OF OFDI ON 
PARENT FIRMS 
There have been several stud-
ies dealing with the effects of 
OFDI from different points of 
view (job creation or redun-
dancies, substitution for do-
mestic production, effects on 
trade, etc.) The topic discussed 
most is perhaps the effect of 
OFDI on employment. The gen-
eral belief among trade unions 
is that investing abroad en-
dangers jobs at home, but this 
has not proved to be a general 
trend. On the contrary, Lipsey, 
Ramstetter and Blomström 
(2000) proved for Japanese in-
vestments, for example, that 
the level of parent production 
and employment at home tend 
to rise as production abroad 
increases. This may result from 
a need for supervisory or ancil-
lary employment to service 
foreign operations. 
With trade, the net impact 
of FDI derives from a complex 
of phenomena. On the one 
hand, foreign production can 
replace previous home-country 
exports, but on the other, FDI 
can also promote exports of 
intermediate goods to the new 
foreign affiliate. Apart from 
that, it is hard to judge what 
would have happened to the 
company if it had not invested 
abroad – whether it would 
have withstood the competi-
tion or been driven out of the 
market, causing losses of jobs 
and exports (BLOMSTRÖM AND 
KOKKO, 2000). There are em-
pirical studies to prove the 
complementary relationship 
between OFDI and exports. For instance, 
Pfaffermayr (1996) showed in Austria 
and Bajo and Munoz (1999) in Spain that 
increased capital outflows led to higher 
exports during the periods of liberaliza-
tion they examined. 
Figure 5 
Effects of OFDI on firms 
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The findings of the survey show 
that the effects of OFDI were greater on 
employment than on trade: 76.2 per cent 
of respondents rated the effects of in-
vestment as neutral on employment. The 
figures were similar for imports and 
production (Figure 5). Only three firms 
said that parent employment had de-
creased or strongly decreased as a result 
of OFDI. With employment, there have 
been cases where OFDI has made it nec-
essary for a Hungarian parent company 
to take on new employees and create a 
separate group or department to manage 
the investment and functioning of the 
new affiliate. (This was the case with 
MOL and MATÁV, two recent big inves-
tors.) 
The effects on market share and ex-
ports proved to be considerable, bringing 
an increase in market shares at 71.4 per 
cent of respondent companies and a rise 
in exports at 60 per cent. Bearing in mind 
that the most important motive for OFDI 
was market related, this means that the 
objectives have been obtained. Indeed, 21 
firms out of 22 said its direct investment 
abroad had been as successful as it had 
expected.  
With the subsequent effects (Table 
13), the responses, like those for motives, 
show that access to cheaper inputs does 
not play an important role in OFDI. In-
vestment abroad is not a kind of cheap 
resource seeking, but a way to serve local 
markets. Customer feedback improved 
and the number of products increased, 
according to the majority of respondents. 
Affiliates generally contributed posi-
tively to the financial performance of 86 
per cent of the respondents, which may 
be surprising, because establishing a for-
eign affiliate can be a financial burden on 
the parent in the short term. The survey 
suggests that this period is fairly limited, 
although it should be remembered that 
the companies surveyed were mainly 
large and well capitalized. Most of the 
affiliates in the survey were founded in 
1996–7. 
Companies in the survey felt that 
their competitive advantages (over competi-
tors) in investing abroad lay mainly in 
technological know-how. This factor was 
marked as important or very important 
by 95.4 per cent of respondents. Firms at 
the end of the 1990s seemed to regard 
their technological level as adequate. In a 
sample containing two pharmaceutical 
companies, the average expenditure on R 
and D as a proportion of net sales was 2.4 
per cent in 2000, which was indeed 
higher than the gen-
eral pattern of less 
than 1 per cent.  
Before the tran-
sition, the adaptation 
level of Hungarian 
enterprises was low. 
They were left outside 
the international net-
works and alliances, 
their technology was 
outdated, and so on. 
Despite the distor-
tions of the system, 
however, a substan-
tial endowment of 
human capital re-
mained after its collapse.  
There were several negative influ-
ences on the technological development 
of Hungarian firms in the 1990s. Initially, 
Table 13 
Effects of OFDI, percentages of responses 
 
Positive Negative Due to the establishment of your 
affiliate abroad: 
Number of 
Responses (%) 
Have you gained access to a cheaper 
input or inputs? (21) 4.76 95.24 
Has customer feedback improved? (20) 90.00 10.00 
Has the number of products in-
creased? (22) 72.73 27.27 
In total, does the investment or in-
vestments abroad contribute posi-
tively to the financial performance of 
your company? 
 
(22) 
 
86.36 
 
13.64 
Are the new affiliates a response to 
the investment strategies of close 
competitor(s) in your industry? 
 
(22) 
 
63.64 
 
36.36 
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the opening of domestic markets to 
Western competitors (the arrival of im-
ports and the establishment of foreign 
subsidiaries in Hungary) led to the col-
lapse of traditional markets, while the 
withdrawal of state subsidies further 
weakened the position of domestic firms 
(ROMIJN, 1998). The privatization process 
lasted for several years, involving 
changes of management and losses of 
employees (some of them highly quali-
fied and experienced). Under those con-
ditions, R and D became a luxury for 
firms struggling for survival. However, 
the arrival of foreign owners had some 
positive effects on technological devel-
opment. Increasing efforts by companies 
to upgrade their technology could be 
seen in the second half of the 1990s, as 
the introduction of ISO standards and 
imports of new machinery became wide-
spread. Expenditure on technology and R 
and D was financed mainly from external 
sources and foreign owners (ROMIJN, 
1998).  
R and D expenditure in manufac-
turing was concentrated on certain sec-
tors (chemicals and engineering). Ac-
cording to one survey,29 corporate ex-
penditure on R and D generally formed a 
low 1–5 per cent of net revenues in the 
mid-1990s and was directed mainly to-
wards product innovation. The main 
aims of the innovation were to improve 
product quality, expand the product 
range and improve penetration of the 
domestic market. Technological innova-
tion was a characteristic feature in elec-
tricity generation, wood processing and 
paper, and basic chemicals. 
Forty-one per cent of the companies 
in the present survey marked organiza-
tional know-how as important or very 
important and 57 per cent found market-
ing knowledge such a factor. Previous 
                                                 
29 This survey, based on questionnaires examin-
ing 110 companies, was conducted by the Innova-
tion Research Centre at the beginning of 1994. 
The results appeared in Külgazdaság, No. 7–8, 
1995. 
research showed that the past had left 
Hungarian companies with privatization 
and reorganization knowledge and ex-
perience in crisis management, which 
they were able to put to good account in 
their acquisitions abroad (ANTALÓCZY, 
2000). There are several cases where 
marketing knowledge was also impor-
tant. The Hungarian owners would dis-
miss inefficient local management after 
buying a company. 
9. THE BARRIERS, THE 
PROBLEMS FOR FIRMS AND 
PROMOTION OF OFDI 
The risks of FDI are well documented in 
the international literature. The risks may 
be specific to the firm, the home country 
or the host country. Of course, the extent 
of the risks varies among countries and 
companies, but they can sometimes lead 
to failures and mistakes. There have been 
cases of Hungarian outward investment 
in which the venture proved unsuccess-
ful. Such failures may be due to insol-
vency of the parent company, a wrong 
choice of plant location, too optimistic an 
assessment of the market prospects, and 
so on. The case of Gardénia shows that 
sometimes there is not just one reason, 
but a coincidence of several. 
Gardénia Csipkefüggönygyár Rt. is 
the biggest curtain (drapery) factory in 
Hungary, founded in 1911. The company 
was privatized in 1991, being sold to two 
financial investors: Hungarian Indus-
tries-Beteiligungen GmbH (62.5 per cent), 
and Österreichische Kontrollbank (5.77 
per cent). The remaining 31.73 per cent of 
the equity was introduced onto the Bu-
dapest Stock Exchange in 1997. The com-
pany had 626 employees in 2000. Gardé-
nia had been conducting a market-oriented 
business policy of modernized production 
since the 1970s, and had built up Western 
contacts. This was commercially success-
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ful, but the company’s fortunes peaked 
in 1995, when the management and the 
majority owner decided to turn Gardénia 
into a regional producer of high-category 
domestic textiles. The management 
would have preferred a slower rate of 
growth based on the domestic market, 
but the majority owner insisted on rapid 
expansion into neighbouring countries. 
In 1996, Gardénia began to expand in 
Hungary and abroad, with clear motives 
of gaining markets. The subsidiary Gar-
denia Textilhandels GmbH was founded 
in 1996 in Austria, as a holding company, 
which in turn established trade affiliates 
in Slovakia and Croatia. (There was no 
other producer of net curtains on the 
market at the time in either country.) A 
chain of franchised brand stores was set 
up. Gardenia Slovakia obtained full 
ownership of HP Habitatio, which runs a 
department store. In 1997, Gardenia ob-
tained a controlling interest in Vossen 
Frottierwaren Produktions- und Ver-
triebs GmbH in Austria, thus becoming a 
co-owner of Vossen Hungária Kft. and of 
two trade firms in the Czech Republic 
and Germany. Also in 1997, Gardenia 
Textilhandels GmbH established a trade 
affiliate in France. Within hardly three 
years, Gardénia Rt. had been converted 
from a medium-sized Hungarian com-
pany into a holding company with an 
international trade network and foreign 
production subsidiaries. 
Gardénia’s spectacular growth, 
however, did not bring success or good 
market positions, for the following rea-
sons: 1. Its expansion coincided with a 
change in fashions towards netted cur-
tain materials. Gardénia had built its ex-
tensive growth on an existing production 
structure, when a structural change was 
required to gain markets. 2. Personnel 
problems appeared. Suitable managers 
for the Slovakian and Croatian affiliates 
could not be found and their turnover 
hardly increased. (The financial capital 
invested was not matched by the human 
capital available.) 3. The competition 
proved greater than expected on both 
markets, so that the subsidiaries made 
losses. A major problem was that the 
main owner of the group (Hungarian 
Industries-Beteiligungen GmbH) had 
started as a financial investor but be-
haved as a professional one. Since the 
management had different reactions to 
the problems, there was no consistent 
strategy. 
The 1997 profits of Gardénia Rt. 
dwindled and turned into losses in 1999. 
Net sales decreased radically, mainly in 
export markets, but also in Hungary. A 
reorganization plan was introduced, the 
CEO was replaced 
and the director 
representing the 
main owner took 
over executive 
direction. The af-
filiates abroad did 
not fulfil expecta-
tions. In 2000, 
Gardénia sold its 
48 per cent share 
in Vossen and its 
Gardenia Slovakia 
s.r.o. subsidiary. 
The Slovakian 
market is now 
served now from 
Hungary. 
Table 14 
Investments abroad by Gardénia Rt. in 1996–7 
 
Name Location Ownership Capital Activity 
Gardenia Textilhan-
dels GmbH Austria 
Gardénia Rt. 
100% ATS 4 mn 
Holding com-
pany 
Gardenia Slovakia 
s.r.o. Slovakia 
Gardenia Textil-
handels GmbH 
100% 
SKK 1 mn Wholesale 
HP Habitatio s.r.o. Slovakia Gardenia Slova-kia s.r.o. 100% SKK 0.1 mn 
Department 
store 
Gardenia Croatia 
d.o.o. Croatia 
Gardenia Textil-
handels GmbH 
100% 
HRK 0.1 
mn 
Wholesale and 
retail 
Distribution de Linge 
de Maison France 
Gardenia Textil-
handels GmbH 
100% 
FRF 0.1 mn Wholesale and retail 
Vossen GmbH Austria Gardénia Rt. 48% ATS 40 mn Towel/bath-textile producer 
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The survey ranged investment risks 
into five main groups: shortage of financ-
ing, shortage of personnel, shortage of 
information, host-specific (destination-
related) factors, and home country-
specific (domestic) factors. The main dif-
ficulty (cited by 63.6 per cent of respon-
dents) proved to be the group of host 
country-specific factors (risk and invest-
ment climate). This can be explained by 
the fact that the affiliates were mainly 
situated in Eastern European countries 
such as Ukraine and Romania, where the 
market economy is systemically less sta-
ble than in Central or Western Europe. 
Another, less important difficulty (41 per 
cent of respondents) was lack of financ-
ing. This was probably a more important 
factor with smaller firms.  Shortage of 
appropriate personnel was cited as an 
important or very important barrier to 
OFDI by 36.3 per cent of the respondents. 
Firms venturing abroad need qualified, 
experienced persons to run the set-up 
process and functioning of a foreign af-
filiate. Domestic factors (administrative 
barriers, legislation) and shortage of in-
formation were relatively less important. 
The problems of investing compa-
nies can be grouped under three heads: 
information, financing and security. The 
fact that firms face problems when in-
vesting abroad may raise the question of 
whether some kind of government sup-
port or promotion should be 
given. The survey asked compa-
nies what the government or 
other organizations should do to 
promote OFDI. About half the 
respondents responded to this 
question. The others did not con-
sider the issue.  
One block of questions re-
ferred to information problems. 
Firms suggested that the gov-
ernment should establish infor-
mation offices and that chambers 
of commerce should help in 
gathering information. As men-
tioned earlier, almost the only 
way that investors collect infor-
mation at present is through per-
sonal contacts. The role of banks and 
chambers was considered negligible so 
far. Personal contacts are likely to remain 
essential in the future, but there is also a 
need to reinforce and acquire supporting 
information, where chambers and banks 
could help more, especially with regula-
tions, legal frameworks and risks in tar-
get countries. A major step has been 
taken in this direction by the Hungarian 
Investment and Trade Development 
Agency (ITDH), which has built up a 
kind of regional database. Its offices 
abroad constantly collect information on 
local regulations, measures and laws, 
and make it available also on the Inter-
net. The ITDH organizes conferences and 
business-matchmaking programmes at 
home and abroad, to widen the invest-
ment opportunities for Hungarian firms. 
With financing, there already exist 
some state institutions to provide capital 
to firms wishing to invest abroad, of 
which the best known is Corvinus Inter-
national Investment Rt., although its 
capital has been rather limited until re-
cently. Its activities seemed to be 
strengthening during 2001, but without 
becoming really significant in scale.30 
                                                 
30 Corvinus International Investment Rt. was 
established in 1997 with a base capital of HUF 1 
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billion. It is 100 per cent owned by agencies of the 
state. In January 2001, the base capital was raised 
to HUF 2.65 billion by one owner, Eximbank. The 
new ownership structure is Eximbank 62.7 per 
cent, Hungarian Development Bank 21.8 per cent, 
Ministry of Economy 7.5 per cent, Ministry of 
Education 7.5 per cent, and Mehib Rt. 0.5 per cent 
(ITDH Newsletter, January–February 2001, p. 4). 
Basically, Corvinus Rt. offers two types of finan-
cial services. 1. Using its own resources, it ac-
quires an interest in a target company together 
with the Hungarian investment partner. In addi-
tion, it provides in certain cases credit facilities to 
assist international expansion. 2. It offers business 
and investment advice and financial, legal and 
technical assistance. Capital investment can mean 
establishing subsidiaries with a Hungarian firm 
or acquiring stakes in foreign companies. In most 
cases, Corvinus as a financial investor does not 
assume a managing role in the venture, leaving 
this to the co-investor. Corvinus Rt. is interested 
in making profits and finding investment oppor-
tunities offering a potential for raising at least 
HUF 15 million. At present, the company may 
not invest more than 10 per cent of the subscribed 
capital (www.corvinus.hu). It usually disposes of 
its stake after 3–6 years. The first investment by 
Corvinus was made as a minority owner in a 
distillery in China in 1998. The second biggest 
investment (HUF 100 million) was made in Ro-
mania with Pécsi Gabona Rt. (40 per cent owner-
ship), representing a 13 per cent stake for 
Corvinus in a bread factory. These two big in-
vestments later proved to be failures. The Chi-
nese factory ceased to function and Pécsi Gabona 
Rt. became insolvent. Smaller investments in 
Romania and Slovakia fulfilled expectations 
(Antalóczy et al., 2000). Since the beginning of 
1999, new management has narrowed the activity 
of Corvinus to neighbouring countries, but ex-
panded its profile to include leasing, guarantees 
and loans, with the example of a German institu-
tion in mind. In May 2000, Corvinus bought 64 
per cent of an engineering firm in Romania, to-
gether with Műszertechnika Rt., and in March 
2001, it bought a 20 per cent stake in the Slova-
kian Euromilk factory for HUF 100 million. (The 
predecessor of the firm had failed and then been 
bought by indigenous Hungarian private inves-
tors in Slovakia –  HVG, March 24, 2001.) The 
present portfolio is as follows: China: 15 per cent, 
Slovakia: 30 per cent and Romania 55 per cent 
(ITDH Newsletter, April 2001). Corvinus, as a 
partner of Danubius Hotels, also owns 35 per cent 
of the Romanian Salina Investment Srl, which 
Respondents indicated a need for 
extra tax allowances for OFDI. They 
would also welcome banks participating 
in the financing of OFDI by providing 
favourable credits. SMEs say they need 
more help with financing investment 
abroad than bigger firms do. General 
promotion of SMEs is a stated priority of 
the government, which can help to put 
them on the sound financial footing re-
quired for OFDI. 
The financing of OFDI depends on 
the financial situation of the investing 
firm. It has been seen that the bulk of the 
outward investment so far has been car-
ried out by firms that are or have been 
quoted on the stock exchange and 
amassed major quantities of capital there 
in the second half of the 1990s. However, 
the Budapest Stock Exchange has been 
showing a declining trend since 1998, 
with the number of quoted companies 
falling and no new introductions. The 
business results and real asset values of 
firms are not being reflected in the stock-
market prices, which hinder raising capi-
tal by this means. These trends call for 
government consideration and incentives 
for firms and private investors. 
The significant risks of investing 
abroad enhance the need for security. Re-
spondents indicated that the government 
should provide guarantees and lobbying 
assistance, support the maintenance of 
foreign trade offices abroad, and provide 
political backup. Other desires expressed 
included less bureaucracy and agree-
ments between countries about OFDI. 
There also appeared the view that 
the government and Hungarian authori-
ties should do nothing. These respon-
dents argued that OFDI is not dependent 
                                                                           
acquired the Sovata spa facilities in September 
2001. 
Some companies have mixed feelings 
about Corvinus, not wanting a third party to be 
involved in their investments or not trusting this 
company specifically (Antalóczy et al., 2000). 
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on promotion measures, but ‘the busi-
ness of the companies’. Direct help from 
governmental organizations will not help 
to promote OFDI. The decisive factors 
are the strength of the investing company 
and other firm-specific characteristics.  
This viewpoint brings the discus-
sion to the factors that promote OFDI 
indirectly. The general economic policy 
needs to create and maintain conditions 
for proper, sound business activity. The 
development of cross-border business 
contacts can be promoted by improving 
infrastructural links such as bridges, mo-
torways and frontier crossing points. 
Economic diplomacy can also help indi-
rectly. For instance, the free-trade agree-
ments recently concluded with some 
neighbouring countries have positive 
effect on Hungarian OFDI in them. The 
latest free-trade agreement was signed 
with Croatia on February 22, 2001 (enter-
ing into force in April). There is one in 
preparation with Macedonia.31 Hungary 
also has bilateral investment treaties and 
agreements on double taxation with the 
neighbouring countries. 
 
* * * * * 
REFERENCES 
Almor, T. (2000): ‘Born Global: The Case 
of Small and Medium-Sized, 
Knowledge-Intensive Israeli Firms’. 
In: Almor, T., and S. Hashai, eds: 
FDI, International Trade and the Eco-
nomics of Peacemaking. Tel Aviv: 
Leon Recanati Graduate School of 
Business Administration. 
                                                 
31 The existing free-trade agreements with CEE 
countries are with Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia (1992), Slovenia (1995), Romania, 
Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia (1997), and Croatia 
(2001). 
Altzinger, W., and C. Bellak (1999): ‘Di-
rect and Indirect FDI in CEE coun-
tries: FDI Strategies and their Im-
pact on Domestic Employment’. 
Contribution presented at the 
INFER Workshop, Speyer, Ger-
many. 
Antalóczy, K., K. Mohácsi and É. Voszka 
(2000): A magyarországi tőkeexport 
jellemzői: elméleti háttér, nemzetközi 
összehasonlítás, statisztikai elemzés és 
empirikus vizsgálatok (The Character-
istics of Hungary’s Capital Exports: 
Theoretical Background, Interna-
tional Comparison, Statistical 
Analysis and Empirical Investiga-
tions). Budapest: Pénzügykutató Rt. 
Bajo, O., and M. Munoz (1999): Foreign 
Direct Investment and Trade: A Cau-
sality Analysis. Working Paper, Uni-
versidad Publica de Navarra. 
Bellak, C. (1997): ‘The Contribution of the 
Restructuring of (large ‘Western’) 
MNCs to the Catching Up of (Small 
‘Eastern’) Countries. Development 
and International Cooperation, Vol. 
XIII, No. 24–25, pp.181–216. 
Bellak, C. (2001): ‘The Austrian Invest-
ment Development Path’. Revised 
version of a paper presented to the 
ITFA, Montpellier. 
Bellak, C., and M. Svetlicic (2001): ‘In-
vestment Development Path of 
Small Transition Countries: Con-
ceptual Background and Empirical 
Evidence’. Contribution to the Con-
ference ‘Small States in World Mar-
kets’, Göteborg. 
Blomström, M. and A. Kokko (2000): Out-
ward Investment, Employment and 
Wages in Swedish Multinationals. 
Working Paper No. 408, Stockholm 
School of Economics. 
 32 
 
Buckley, P., and F. Castro (1998): ‘The 
Investment Development Path: The 
Case of Portugal’. Transnational Cor-
porations, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 1–15. 
Castello, S., J. Olienyk and T. Ozawa 
(1997): ‘Nation Size, Outward Ori-
entation and Structural Adaptabil-
ity: Small versus Large European 
Economies’. Development and Inter-
national Cooperation, Vol. XIII, No. 
24–5, pp. 85–104. 
Cavusgil, S.T. (1980): ‘On the Interna-
tionalization Process of Firms’. En-
terprise Research, pp. 273–81. 
Dunning, J., and R. Narula (1996): Foreign 
Direct Investment and Governments. 
Vienna: Routledge.  
Dunning, J.H. (1981): ‘Explaining the In-
ternational Direct Investment Posi-
tion of Countries: Towards a Dy-
namic or Developmental Ap-
proach’. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 
Vol. 117, No. 1, pp. 30–64. 
Éltető, A., and M. Sass (1998): Motivations 
and Behaviour by Hungary’s Foreign 
Investors in Relation to Exports. IWE 
Working Paper, No. 88, Budapest: 
Institute for World Economics. 
Gankema, H., H.R. Snuif and P. Zwart 
(2000): ‘The Internationalization 
Process of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises: An Evaluation of the 
Stage Theory’. Journal of Small Busi-
ness Management, October, pp. 15–
27. 
Hogenbirk, A. and R. Narula (1999): 
‘Globalization and the Small Econ-
omy: The Case of the Netherlands’. 
MERIT Research Paper, No. 002, 
Maastricht Economic Research In-
stitute on Innovation and Technol-
ogy. 
Johanson, J., and J.E. Vahlne (1977): ‘The 
Internationalization Process of the 
Firm’. Journal of International Busi-
ness Studies, Vol. 8. 
Lichtblau, K.(2000): ‘Internationalisie-
rung von Dienstleistungen’. IW 
Trends, No.1, pp. 61–71. 
Lipsey, R.E., E. Ramstetter and M. Blom-
ström (2000): Outward FDI and Home 
Country Exports: Japan, the United 
States and Sweden. SSE/EFI Working 
Paper Series in Economics and Fi-
nance, No. 369. 
Luostarinen, R. (1978): Internationalization 
Process of the Firm – Different Re-
search Approaches. FBO Working Pa-
per, Helsinki: Helsinki School of 
Economics. 
Luostarinen, R. (1994): Internationalization 
of Finnish Firms and Their Response to 
Global Challenges. Helsinki: World 
Institute for Development Econom-
ics Research. 
McMillan, C. (1987): Multinationals from 
the Second World – Growth of Foreign 
Investment by Soviet and East Euro-
pean Enterprises. London: Macmillan 
Press. 
Oszlay, A. (2000): Outward Internalization 
by Direct Investment: The Case of 
Hungary. November. Paper pre-
pared for Phare ACE Project No. 
97–8073–R. 
Pan, Y., and D. Tse (2000): ‘The Hierar-
chical Model of Market Entry 
Modes’. Journal of International Busi-
ness Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 535–
46. 
  
33
Pfaffermayr, M. (1996): ‘Foreign Outward 
Direct Investments and Exports in 
Austrian Manufacturing: Substi-
tutes or Complements?’ Welt-
wirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 132, pp. 
501–22.  
Reuber, A.R., and E. Fischer (1997): ‘The 
Influence of the Management 
Team’s International Experience on 
the Internationalization Behaviour 
of SMEs’. Journal of International 
Business Studies, Winter, No. 4, pp. 
807–26. 
Romijn, H. (1998): Technology Development 
in Transition – The Case of Hungarian 
Industry. Queen Elizabeth House 
Working Paper Series, No. 14, Feb-
ruary, Oxford: University of Ox-
ford. 
Shrader, R., B. Oviatt and P.P. McDougall 
(2000): ‘How New Ventures Exploit 
Trade-offs among International Risk 
Factors: Lessons for the Accelerated 
Internationalization of the 21st Cen-
tury’. Academy of Management Jour-
nal, Vol. 43, No. 8, pp. 1227–47. 
Stare, M. (2000): ‘Internationalization of 
the Service Sector in Central Euro-
pean Countries’. Paper prepared for 
Phare ACE Project No. 97-8073-R. 
 
